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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LEGAL VERSUS 
CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONNOTATIONS  
OF THE TERM ‘GUILT’: IMPLICATIONS FOR COGNITIVE 
LINGUISTICS AND FOR LEGAL SCIENCES 
The present article is concerned with the notion of ‘guilt’ as understood by the legal 
sciences and in the context of psychology and culture studies. Although legal 
connotations are unavoidable, ‘guilt’ is a term emotionally related to other feelings 
like ‘shame’, ‘fear’, ‘sadness’ etc. The analysis shall take a closer look at legal 
definitions of ‘guilt’ and ‘culpability’ at work in the American, Polish and German 
legal systems and refer the equivalents existing in these languages (wina,Schuld) to 
the concept of guilt understood as an emotion. As it turns out, legal definitions do not 
account for conceptual dimension of meaning and as such, they can only serve as 
departure points for further analysis to be complemented with cognitive analysis. 
‘Guilt’ is a culturally determined and complex emotion that may be ‘dissected’ into 
several more basic emotional states. The underlying assumption is that there are 
differences in the understanding of the concept ‘guilt’ across languages which must 
be taken into account by the translators who deal with translational equivalents. 
Keywords: guilt, cognitive linguistics, legal definition, conceptualization  
1. Introduction: cognitivism, its advantages and limitations  
with regard to legal sciences 
This article is an attempt at comparing legal definitions (as a strictly ‘legal’ 
point of view) and cultural as well as psychological connotations related to the 
term ‘guilt’. As far as legal definitions are concerned, they vary depending on the 
legal system. Hence, the research methods employed in the paper are typical for 
comparative law since three distinct legal systems are taken into consideration. 
Worthy of notice is the fact that while Polish and German legal systems make 
part of the civil law family, the American legal system is, in turn, based on the 
common law. The said distinction is crucial insofar as fundamental concepts and 
terminology differ in some respects. Most importantly, civil law jurisdictions 
have developed the body of laws and statutes that contain general definitions. 
These are usually followed by the doctrine created by jurists and law professors 
that interpret the vague and indeterminate clauses and terms arousing doubts and 
controversies. In turn, common law definitions are based on the interpretations 
prepared by the judges who participate to a considerable extent in the process of 
legislation. However, the above discrepancies contribute to the fact that certain 
terms may be differently understood depending on the language and the legal 
system. This ‘flaw’ is something legal translators are aware of. In the light of the 
above, the goal would be to gain a perspective free from specific properties of 
particular languages and legal system. Since certain disciplines within linguistics 
offer a broader perspective and constitute an attempt at creating a universal 
method of representing various notions across languages, we will avail ourselves 
of these methods. Cognitivism is one such discipline. 
Since its beginnings in the 1970s, cognitivism has made a significant 
contribution in the way subject matters are approached across various fields, both 
scientific and social. Although legal specialists are somehow reluctant towards 
cognitive methods as able to influence the legal and philosophical debates 
concerning human agency or free will (cf. Załuski 2014), the author claims that 
they may nevertheless become a research tool for translation sciences. On the one 
hand, cognitive sciences are considered to constitute a breakthrough in the manner 
we view human mind and as such, may threaten the status of philosophy which 
has to date held a monopoly in this respect. On the grounds of linguistics, it was 
Lakoff and his cognitive metaphor theory that helped to construct the ‘empirical’ 
approach towards the understanding of the relations between perception on the 
one hand, and language, on the other. Lakoff and Johnson argue that all cognition 
is embodied and that other domains are mapped onto our embodied knowledge 
using a combination of conceptual metaphor, prototypes and image schema 
(Lakoff, Johnson 1980: 56-60). In other words, we tend to map our understanding 
of known physical objects, actions and situations, such as containers, to 
understand more abstract domains, such as relationships or numbers (1980: 56- 
60). This somewhat controversial tenet has not been accepted unanimously and 
certain legal scholars, such as Załuski (2014: 175), claim that the methods 
proposed by cognitivism are formulated in a very vague way and that they can be 
assigned a variety of meanings. Furthermore, he claims that the above tenets are 
false insofar as thinking processes do not have to be determined by the body, that 
not all of the thinking processes are of metaphorical nature and that certain 
thinking processes are entirely conscious. Likewise, some of the cognitivists 
themselves are doubtful as to whether our bodies somehow determine the 
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boundaries of reasoning. Some of the reasoning processes, they claim, occur and 
are performed independently of the commands of the body (see Beard 2001, 
O’Donovan Anderson 2000, Sowa 1999). The statement that all types of 
reasoning processes are anchored in our body has therefore been challenged. 
Notwithstanding the above criticisms, the present article aims to determine 
which of methods, the cognitive or legal, offers better tools to identify the most 
accurate equivalent in a given language and demonstrate that legal definitions (as 
firm and enshrined in the statutes and not flexible enough) are not sufficient tools 
for translation purposes unless complemented by cognitive analysis (dynamic 
meaning as occurring in various contexts).  
2. Guilt as an emotion: possible applications in linguistics 
2.1. Introductory remarks 
At the beginning of this section let us stress that the issue at hand is not 
treated exhaustively from the psychological point of view due to the necessity of 
combining the ‘psychological’ approach with the ‘legal’ approach. Hence, the 
present section focuses solely on the most important aspects and possible 
understandings of the term ‘guilt’ as appearing in various studies and analyses 
other than the criminal codes and statutes.  
According to etymology dictionary, the term ‘guilt’ originates in the Old 
English word gylt understood as ‘crime, sin, moral defect, failure of duty’. The 
early 14th century definition construes guilt as ‘that state of a moral agent which 
results from his commission of a crime or an offense willfully or by consent’.1 
Thus, the usage of the term was strictly confined to the domain of law and it was 
not until the end of the 17th century that the first recorded use of “guilt” in its 
psychological sense is documented. As was the case with the ‘semantic 
extensions’ of similar nature, the purists considered this new usage to be 
erroneous.2 Hence, in the course of evolution, ‘guilt’ acquired a new meaning. 
2.2. Cognitive and psychological understanding of the term ‘guilt’ 
For the purposes of the present paper, guilt shall be understood as either 
cognitive or emotional (affective) state. On the cognitive level, guilt occurs as an 
expression of an internal conflict or since a person is aware of his or her 
1 Source: Online Etymology Dictionary: https://www.etymonline.com/word/guilt [last accessed 
on 17th April 2020]. 
2 Ibid. 
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wrongdoings towards the other or society in general. The internal conflicts, as 
assumed by Freud in his theory of psychoanalysis, result from traumas and 
deprivations experienced during one’s childhood and affect the unconscious 
component of the human mind. On the emotional level, guilt evokes other 
emotional states like shame, fear, anger. Equally closely related to guilt is the 
feeling of remorse.  
What seems common, however, in the majority of operative definitions of 
guilt is that a person experiences some sort of conflict due to having transgressed 
certain norms or conventions considered binding or due to not having done 
something one was supposed to do. Freud believed that the primary sources of 
guilt were fear of authority and fear of loss of parental love, which eventually 
become one's conscience (ibid.). The sense of guilt is central to Freud’s theory of 
the Ego and the Id and arises when the conscience, or the superego, condemns 
the ego (Westerink 2009). Hence, it transpires that the formation of the superego, 
synonymous with morality, accounts for the pathological types like moral 
masochism, hysteria, obsessive neurosis or melancholia. Buber (1958), in turn, 
emphasizes the difference between Freudian guilt based on the internal conflict 
of an individual on the one hand, and existential guilt, based on actual harm done 
to others. 
2.3. Neurological approach to feelings and emotions;  
differences between feelings and emotions 
As far as neurological approach to emotions is concerned, psychologists have 
elaborated specific questionnaires employed to measure the degree of guilt such 
as the Dutch Guilt Measurement Instrument or the Differential Emotions Scale 
(Izard's DES). In addition, attempts have been made by various researchers to 
localize the basis of human emotions, guilt amongst others, with brain imaging 
studies. In particular, emotional states of fear, shame and guilt have been 
investigated as depending to some extent upon the activities of amygdala, 
a paired structure of the brain known as ‘the center of fear’, located medially 
within the temporal lobes. As such, amygdala plays a key role in the conso-
lidation of a subconscious type of memory where emotions originate. However, 
correspondence between brain basis and emotions other than fear, shame and 
guilt has not been well illustrated (Michl, Meindl 2014). 
Let us also point to the difference between emotions and feelings as these 
two terms are often used interchangeably. Whilst emotions are defined as lower 
responses occurring in the subcortical region of the brain, feelings originate in 
the neocortical, or conscious, part of the brain (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio 
2000). Hence, while emotions are universal, feelings are more personal and 
subjective and depend upon a person’s experiences and memories. Summarizing 
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the distinction outlined above, one may venture a claim that emotions are 
primary and instinctual while feelings, are secondary and arise as a result of 
assigning specific meanings to emotions (ibid.). 
2.4. Cultural connotations of the term ‘guilt’ 
As far as cultural connotations are concerned, it is the social and objective 
interpretation of the term ‘guilt’ that is inextricably linked to the term 
‘punishment’. Lewis classifies guilt as the primary self-conscious emotion along 
shame, embarrassment and pride (Lewis 2010). The collocation ‘guilt and 
punishment’ has a very strong cultural connotation in the culture of the West 
which we, born and bred in the Western cultural area, take for granted. However, 
for those born outside of the Western culture, this connotation is not so obvious. 
One of the classifications allowing to better understand the mode of thinking and 
moral impulses which determine behavior patterns in various cultures is a simple 
distinction into the culture of guilt and the culture of shame discussed, inter alia, 
by Andrzej Flis (2001: 31-36). The said distinction is based on the decisive factor 
which influences individuals’ moral choices: guilt in the case the West and 
shame in the case of the East. Both the Western and Middle East cultures are 
permeated with the faith in one God. Despite an enormous contribution that 
philosophy brought to the Western system of values, it is mostly religion which 
has remained the fundamental pillar of Western morality throughout centuries. 
The conviction that God constitutes the very source of morality is deeply 
entrenched and numerous writers as well as philosophers, such as Dostoyevsky 
or Kołakowski (2019), are inclined to share this view. It is one’s internal negative 
self-assessment based on the concept of sin that leads to the feeling of guilt. 
Originally, it was the omniscient God who assumed the role of the strict judge. 
However, no ‘external’ blaming is necessary today since everything takes place 
within one’s own conscience and all emotions are experienced by an individual 
alone (ibid.). 
Morality in the cultures of the Far East are not to be attributed to God but 
have been formulated in the secular code of Confucius. No one and nothing has 
here access to the human conscience nor is the concept of sin so common as in 
the Western cultural sphere. The only liability humans bear is towards one 
another, within the community one makes part of. Therefore, the presence of 
witnesses exacerbates and intensifies the feeling of shame impending over one’s 
conscience. Hence the fear of the loss of face so common for the cultures of the 
Far East. Inter-cultural understanding of the motives and impulses is thus 
considerably hindered when one takes into consideration the above paradigms. 
The distinction into right and wrong is determined by one’s internal conscience 
as far as Western civilization is concerned. On the other hand, it will be 
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determined by the community fulfilling the role of the judge issuing moral 
verdicts. Apart from guilt and shame, Benedict distinguishes fear as a factor 
determining control of individuals (especially children) and maintaining social 
order (Benedict 1989). The differences apply to the methods of governing one’s 
behavior patterns with respect to government laws, business rules, or social 
etiquette. When viewed from such a perspective, societies can be divided into: 
– guilt societies, 
– shame societies, 
– fear societies (ibid). 
Summarizing the definitions outlined above, we may describe the main 
difference between shame and guilt as lying in the very source of the emotion 
itself: whilst shame comes from a real or imagined negative assessment of others, 
guilt arises from negative self-assessment. 
2.5. Attempts at classifying the emotions 
In 1972 Ekman, an American psychologist focused on identifying the most 
basic set of emotions that can be expressed distinctly in the form of a facial 
expression. He devised a list of basic emotions following a research conducted 
across different cultures. The said list contains such emotions as: anger, disgust, 
fear, happiness, sadness and surprise. Parrot (2001), in turn, organized emotions 
in a three-level hierarchical structure which included emotions such as love, joy, 
surprise, anger, sadness and fear as primary. The first two layers of Parrot’s 
classification are shown in a figure below. 
Guilt as an emotional state is also present in Plutchik’s wheel of emotions 
proposed as a method of categorization in 1980. The author distinguishes eight 
primary emotions that are classified into four groups understood as polar 
opposites:  
– joy and sadness, 
– trust and disgust, 
– fear and anger, 
– surprise and anticipation (ibid.) 
Adding up of these primary emotions will yield new, more complex ones, 
constituting either dyads (emotions composed of two basic feelings) or tryads 
(emotions composed of three basic feelings). For instance, love is defined as 
a combination of joy and trust and counts as a primary dyad, meaning the most 
often felt. In contrast, there are also secondary and tertiary dyads, depending on 
how often we experience them. In total, the author claims there are 24 dyads and 
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32 tryads. Guilt is defined as a secondary dyad, a human feeling composed of joy 
and fear whose opposite feeling is envy. A feeling which remains in close affinity 
to guilt is remorse, described as a primary dyad and a combination of sadness and 
disgust. There is also an intensity scale, depending on the degree of intensity of 
a given emotion. For instance, joy is characterized as ranging from serenity (the 
most neutral and toned down as far as intensity is concerned) to ecstasy (the most 
intense) and fear ranges from apprehension to terror. Looking at guilt as 
a ‘synthesis’ of joy and fear might not seem convincing for everyone. Hence, 
Plutchik’s wheel of emotions has been criticized for being too superficial. not 
giving sufficient account of feelings such as pride and shame. Therefore, other 
attempts have been made to account for such subtleties. An example is Geneva 
emotional wheel (GEW), a theoretically derived tool designed to measure 
emotional reactions. GEW has been discussed in works such as Scherer (2005) 
and Sacharin, Schlegel and Scherer (2012). Figure 1 demonstrates how the tool 
operates in practice. Emotions are grouped into a shape resembling a wheel with 
the ‘axes’ being described with the aid of two major parametres, i.e. high/low 
control or positive/negative valence. Guilt is understood as related to remorse, 
defined by the low control and negative valence as illustrated by the figure below. 
Figure 1: First two layers of Parrot's emotion classification  
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The question arises whether it is possible to apply the above definitions and 
connotations when working with particular texts or during translation. The 
answer would probably depend upon the type of text one is dealing with. The 
more a text is ‘culturally’ tainted, the more it becomes necessary to familiarize 
oneself with the cultural background of the source culture.  
3. The ‘legal’ perspective 
Numerous authors drew on cognitivism in their research on legal language 
and legal translation. They include, inter alia: Biel (2009), Caterina (2004), 
Jeanpierre (2011), Kischel (2009) and Kjær (2000, 2004, 2011). Biel, for 
instance, examines the role of cognitive sciences in the comprehensibility and 
organizing knowledge structures and stresses that further research is required as 
far as the process of mapping concepts during the translation process is 
concerned (Biel 2009: 176-189). The psychological perspective elaborated on in 
the previous section is also at work in one of the definitions commonly accepted 
by the legal sciences. The definition is referred to as psychological since it sees 
guilt as a mental attitude of the perpetrator towards the act; the issue at stake here 
is whether he/she intended to commit the crime and whether he/she approved of 
it. Legal scholars refer to the above as the psychological theory of guilt (see 
Figure 2: Geneva Emotion Wheel (GEW)  
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Świecki 2009). Since it is too ‘psychologically’ tainted, another, more objective 
definition of guilt has been construed in order to counterbalance it.  
The normative theory of guilt, as it is called, concentrates on the possibility 
of filing a charge against the perpetrator in case he/she violates the laws currently 
in force (Świecki 2009). The doctrine regarded as most neutral combines the two 
hitherto mentioned definitions: the psychological one and the normative one. 
Could we employ both definitions in producing a cognitive ‘dissection’ of the 
term ‘guilt’ in the way we have seen operating for the ‘remorse’? Typically, we 
would have to distinguish between the objective and the subjective kind of guilt. 
The former one would relate to the violation of laws or social norms by an 
individual, regardless of whether he/she considers himself/herself blameworthy. 
The latter concerns contravening one’s own set of values and principles 
regardless of what the society views as moral and lawful. In many cases, the two 
may concur insofar as what the individual considers wrong is also viewed as such 
by the society (ibid.). 
We might also differentiate between ‘guilt’ and ‘culpability’ or ‘punish-
ability’. Whereas the former one is more concerned with the subjective aspect 
and person’s attitude, the latter would rather be associated with social approach 
as involving civil responsibility/liability for one’s wrongdoing and the necessity 
to undergo punishment or trial in order to compensate for the harm done. The 
problem encountered in many studies (be it from the domain of natural or social 
sciences) is that they employ an Anglo-centric (or, as a matter of fact, a language 
specific) perspective that does not account for conceptual differences. ‘Guilt’ is 
a culturally determined and complex emotion that may be ‘dissected’ into several 
more basic emotional states. 
The main advantage that cognitive sciences offer is the universal and ‘global’ 
approach towards the subject matter. In the case of law, juristic notions are 
necessarily tainted with the legal systems the history of particular countries 
where they have evolved and are rooted in the understanding of the speakers of 
those countries’ native tongues3. According to Charnock (2006):  
Where the meaning of a statute has not been authoritatively decided, judges refer to the 
meaning clauses, which form an integral part of English statutes. However, these clauses 
do not usually supply detailed definitions. On the contrary, they tend to refer only to 
prototypical cases (…) thus permitting the elimination of certain improbable, peripheral 
interpretations. (…) Typical examples of such phrases are: ‘unless the contrary intention 
appears’ or ‘except insofar as the context otherwise requires’. In cases of linguistic 
indeterminacy, meanings clauses are rarely useful as an aid to adjudication. 
3 cf. Hilary Putnam’s proposal that the meaning of particular terms is to be understood as 
changing in the course of time and in accordance with the evolution of speech communities 
using those terms. 
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Some criminal law definitions leave ‘fringe areas’ (a term borrowed from 
cognitivism) as to their meaning and scope. In the view of ‘terminological 
policy’ it is sometimes preferable to leave some degree of interpretational 
freedom in determining the verdict. The initiative is, depending upon a situation, 
either to be taken by the Parliament, or by the court.  
In the case of common law, definitions have been ‘forged’ on the basis of 
‘folk knowledge’. However, as applied in the common law and Anglo-Saxon 
legal culture (and fulfilling the criteria of the ‘common sense’ definitions), they 
do not remain stagnant nor fixed due to constant evolution in the course of 
history. Changing legal and political systems affect the content and not only the 
peripheral but also the prototypical or core elements of meaning. This would be 
more clearly visible in the case of Polish legal system which underwent 
transformations resulting from a shift from the communist and socialist mode of 
economy to the capitalist economy and free market system. As such, definition 
would be a temporary point of departure to be applied in the interpretation of 
a given text. As emphasized, however, one needs to take account of the 
temporary nature of many concepts.  
Legal definitions are contained at the beginning of particular normative acts. 
Such a definition bindingly establishes the meaning of a given term. The legal 
definition proves useful insofar as the term is considered ambiguous or even 
polysemous. In the Polish legal system the mode of use of legal definitions is 
included in The Principles Of Legislative Technique.4 Pursuant to these 
principles, legal definitions should be included whenever:  
– A given term or phrase is ambiguous; 
– A given term or phrase is vague and narrowing its vagueness is necessary;  
– The meaning of a given term or phrase is not commonly understood; 
– Due to the nature of the discipline where regulation takes place, a necessity 
arises to establish a new meaning of a given term or phrase.5 
4. The notion of guilt and culpability in the Polish, American  
and German legal systems: comparative analysis 
Let us now take a closer look at the understanding of the term ‘guilt’ in 
particular legal systems. The point of departure for our analysis is the English 
term ‘guilt’ (‘Polish wina) and ‘culpability’ (Polish zawinienie). From a legal 
perspective, culpability describes the degree of one's blameworthiness (Polish 
4 Annex to the regulation of the Prime Minister as of 20th June 2002 on ‘Principles of 
Legislative Technique’ (Journal of Laws, No 100, item 908). 
5 Ibid. 
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karygodność) in perpetrating a crime or a misdemeanor. The degree of culpa-
bility will usually be the determining factor in deciding upon the punishment. 
According to Arnone (2014): 
‘Culpability means, first and foremost, direct involvement in the wrongdoing, such as 
through participation or instruction’, as compared with responsibility merely arising from 
‘failure to supervise or to maintain adequate controls or ethical culture’. 
In order to have a broader perspective, the author has decided to choose three 
legal systems where guilt is defined either by the doctrine (as in the case of 
Polish and German) or by the proposed legislation, the so called Model Penal 
Law (as is the case with the American legal system). 
4.1. ‘Guilt’ and ‘culpability’ in the American legal system 
Modern criminal codes in the United States usually distinguish between four 
degrees of culpability depending upon the attitude of the perpetrator towards the 
prohibited act:  
– when it is the perpetrator’s conscious and purposeful intention to engage in 
the conduct of criminal nature or to cause a given result. 
– when the perpetrator is aware and knows that his/her conduct is of criminal 
nature. 
– When the perpetrator acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an 
offense when he/she consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.  
– When the perpetrator acts negligently with respect to a material element 
of an offense where he/she should be aware of a substantial and unjusti-
fiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his/her con-
duct.6  
The above definitions have been taken from the Pennsylvania Crimes Code. 
That in turn derives from the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, which 
is the basis for large portions of the criminal codes in most states.7 The key 
element of those definitions is usually an adjective or a verb that determine the 
degree of culpability. In the order of gravity one would have to distinguish: 
purposeful (criminal) conduct, knowing conduct, reckless conduct and negligent 
conduct. Guilt, which whose semantics overlap to a considerable extent with 
6 2010 Pennsylvania Crimes Code: https://law.justia.com/codes/pennsylvania/2010/title-18/ 
7 Model Penal Code (Proposed Official Draft dated 1962). 
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culpability, always has to be accompanied by some sort of attribute. Otherwise it 
will be difficult to define (and thus, translate) due to the inherent vagueness of 
the term itself. 
4.2. ‘Wina’ and ‘zawinienie’ in the Polish legal system 
The notion of guilt can be characterized through indeterminacy and 
vagueness. Under criminal law, it almost always occurs in the context of crime, 
being one of its elements next to the statutory hallmarks of a prohibited act 
(or the statutory definition), the unlawfulness and guilt itself. Despite the 
distinctions elaborated by the legislator (Polish Criminal Code and Polish Code 
of Criminal Procedure) and the doctrine, each particular case usually necessitates 
interpretation by the judge determining the verdict. Legal definitions do not give 
sufficient grounds for ‘the proper’ interpretation. The so called statutory 
hallmarks (in Polish: ustawowe znamiona) of a prohibited act or the characteristic 
features refer to four aspects:   
– the value protected by the law (the object), 
– the perpetrator (the subject),  
– his/her act (the objective element) and  
– the psychic attitude of the perpetrator to the committed act (the subjective 
element).   
Unlawfulness, in turn, is usually defined as the fact of there being a discre-
pancy between the actual behaviour and the sphere of obligation; generally 
unlawfulness cannot be considered separately from human behaviour; we rather 
look at unlawful behaviour and unlawful acts not at an unlawfulness per se 
(Sójka-Zielińska 2011). The third constitutive element of the crime, „guilt’, does 
occur in the Polish material and procedural law but it has various meanings. The 
legislator has not defined it leaving it to the doctrine and the judge to determine 
its significance (Świecki 2009). In the historical perspective, „guilt’ has evolved 
and has shifted on the objectivity-subjectivity continuum. Whereas it was 
formerly the objective liability (the visible marks of the crime) that constituted 
guilt, it is nowadays the subjective and personal liability that determines whether 
one is guilty or not. In the penal code guilt is one of the elements of the crime: the 
inflicted punishment depends upon the grade of guilt and constitutes a premise 
for the conditional discontinuation of legal proceedings. In the code of criminal 
procedure the term „guilt’ is polysemous and occurs as:  
– an evidence for determining the guilt of a perpetrator,  
– as an evidential statement of the defendant pleading guilty,  
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– as an indicator of ‘borders’ of persecution in case where the appellant 
challenges his/her guilt before courts of higher instances. 
4.3. ‘Schuld’, ‘Sträflichkeit’ or the notion of guilt in German legal system8 
Although the notion of guilt is not clearly defined in the German criminal 
system, one may, following Gropp (2003), distinguish between three meanings 
of the term. The first one approaches guilt as a departure point for determining 
the punishment (Grundlage fur die Zumessung der Strafe). Guilt is here 
understood not qualitatively but quantitatively: as a degree rather than something 
stable. The greater the degree, the more severe the punishment. Guilt of the 
perpetrator is therefore tantamount to committing a criminal act violating the law 
but will be approached differently depending on the circumstances. Hence, an act 
of murdering one human being will differ from an attack on Wolrd Trade Center 
as a result of which 3,000 people were killed. 
The second understanding of the term ‘guilt’ is based on the person rather 
than the act itself. In order to ascribe guilt to someone, it would be necessary that 
this person acts knowingly and with awareness that law is being breached. 
Otherwise speaking, this person is capable of anticipating the consequences of 
his/her wrongdoings and has full control over his/her behavior (Einsichtsfä-
higkeit and Steuerungsfähigkeit). 
Lack of either of the two elements specified above equals no punishment (the 
judge cannot issue the verdict of guilty since there are no grounds for a sentence). 
A similar situation arises when the so called error with regard to the unlawfulness 
of the act occurs (unvermeidbarer Verbotsirrtum). In § 17 dStGB one can find 
a statement regarding actions performed without an intention of committing 
a crime. Such a state of affairs makes punishing impossible since a perpetrator 
cannot be ascribed guilt. An error with regard to the unlawfulness of the act 
is therefore tantamount to the impossibility of avoiding the wrongdoing or 
a criminal act.9 
The third understanding of the term ‘guilt’ refers to the notion of entschul-
digender Notstand which may be described as ‘the state of necessity justifying 
the offence’. As pointed by Gropp (2003), one may see it as a sort of external 
pressure and a relatively lesser degree of unlawfulness. Similarly to the Polish 
and American legal system, the German legal system distinguishes between 
degrees of guilt. When certain statutorily specified circumstances occur, 
8 Source: http://www.juridicainternational.eu/?id=12513: 
9 Strafgesetzbuch, Allgemeiner Teil (§§ 1 - 79b), Abschnitt - Die Tat (§§ 13 - 37), Titel - 
Grundlagen der Strafbarkeit (§§ 13 - 21): ‘Fehlt dem Täter bei Begehung der Tat die Einsicht, 
Unrecht zu tun, so handelt er ohne Schuld, wenn er diesen Irrtum nicht vermeiden konnte. 
Konnte der Täter den Irrtum vermeiden, so kann die Strafe nach § 49 Abs. 1 gemildert werden.’ 
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assigning a lesser degree of guilt may be equal to a less severe sentence. 
However, as in two other legal systems, it is not always clear how ‘guilt’ should 
be interpreted and what degree it should be ascribed. A judge is therefore left 
with considerable interpretational freedom.  
5. Conclusions: implications for linguistics 
As far as legal sciences are concerned, guilt is usually understood in the 
context of the crime committed by the perpetrator and serves as evidence for 
determining the verdict during the proceedings. In the course of evolution of the 
term, there has been a significant shift towards a more subjective understanding. 
Additionally, more complex notions have emerged as a result of a more 
interdisciplinary approach towards the issue. Psychological as well as cognitive 
sciences have also contributed to the development of the ‘default’ legal 
definition. As far as linguistics is concerned, psychology and culture can be of 
invaluable help insofar as they allow us to ‘separate’ ourselves from the text and 
particular lexical units and refer these units to the reality beyond. In the words of 
Newmark (1988: 22-23) this process sometimes involves deverbalizing the 
concepts. As Panek (2008) points out:  
Each culture categorizes phenomena in a slightly different way, even if phenomena like 
Roman law can work as the common denominator (…) Terminologies differ, taxonomy 
fields or various radial categories are different. Consequently, the receiver’s prerequisite 
knowledge must be different. The way a receiver perceives a foreign legal term will in 
turn depend on his or her prerequisite knowledge, ways of conceptualization, mental by 
nature and objective by convention. 
To refer to the above from the translator’s point of view, terms become 
concepts once they undergo interpretation in the speakers’ minds and are 
afterwards rendered into another language with the intention to retain as much of 
the term’s denotation and connotations (i.e. the central as well as the peripheral 
categories) as is practically possible. Conceptualization might be thus considered 
an intermediate stage between the interpretative reception of a translator and 
producing or coming up with the closest possible equivalent. Such (legal) 
equivalent can afterwards be defined and disambiguated in the target language 
and (legal) culture. In the course of the translation, particular terms need to 
undergo ‘conceptualization’ in the translator’s mind and thus, they are ‘detached’ 
from the language’s specific lexicon.  
To sum up, the cognitive method might prove useful insofar as it aspires to 
be universal, not tainted by the individual (in our case – cultural) perception. The 
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example of the term ‘guilt’ and its renditions across various languages provides 
us with an insight of how a term should be analyzed not only verbally but also 
conceptually. The latter aspect involves psychological and cultural connotations 
which must be taken into consideration, in particular when translating between 
distant cultures. Let us emphasize here once more that inter-cultural under-
standing of the motives and impulses can be considerably hindered if one is not 
familiar with the cultural background. Hence, between criminology and 
cognitivism there exists a co-relation whose potential should also be explored 
by legal translators. Therefore, the author maintains that cognitivism might 
become a useful tool for translation studies despite certain claims that discard its 
significance as a method appropriate for the legal sciences. Naturally, the 
problem outlined in the present paper requires further investigation since analysis 
of renditions of legal terms employed in European legal systems into languages 
such as Japanese or Chinese and vice versa could also contribute to a better 
understanding of how conceptualization operates in practice.  
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